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“PREPARE FOR TROUBLE, AND MAKE IT DOUBLE”1: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CONTINUES 





I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In Wachovia Securities v. Brand, the Fourth Circuit held that arbitrators do not act 
in manifest disregard of the law by failing to adhere to state procedural laws where state 
substantive laws govern the underlying dispute.
2
 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 
national policy favoring arbitration, at least in part, favors the expedited nature of 
arbitration proceedings. Accordingly, where an arbitration agreement mandates that state 
substantive law governs the underlying dispute, the arbitrator may elect not to adhere to 
the law’s procedural provisions, unless ignoring those provisions unduly prejudices the 
parties. In drawing its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit assessed manifest disregard of the 
law as a grounds for vacating arbitral awards, concluding that the legitimacy of the 
doctrine remained unclear in United States arbitration law. While immaterial to the 
disposition of the case, the Fourth Circuit’s indecision provided ambiguous guidance to 
the lower courts, which must continue to grapple with inconsistent precedent when 
determining whether and how to apply the manifest disregard doctrine. The resulting 
intra-jurisdictional variability frustrates the Supreme Court’s efforts to federalize U.S. 
arbitration law. 
II.   BACKGROUND 
 On October 1, 2007, Wachovia Securities merged with A.G. Edwards.
3
 Frank 
Brand, Stephen Jones, Marvin Slaughter and George Stukesall (collectively, the “Former 
Employees”), employees of the A.G. Edwards branch in Florence, South Carolina at the 
time of the merger, became employed by Wachovia Securities before being terminated on 
June 26, 2008.
4
 Thereafter, the Former Employees began working at a competing 
brokerage firm in Florence.
5
 
                                                 
1
 Pokemon: Pokemon Emergency! (4Kids Entertainment September 9, 1998) (quoting the introductory 
chant of Team Rocket members Jesse and James). 
*
 Garrett Lent is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2015 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.  
2
 Wachovia Sec., L.L.C. v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012). 
3
 See Wachovia Sec., L.L.C. v. Brand, Civ.A. No. 4:08-CV-02349-TLW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88505, at 




 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 475. 
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 On June 27, 2008, Wachovia initiated arbitration against the Former Employees 
by filing a Statement of Claim with the Financial Industry Regulatory Agency 
(“FINRA”).6 Wachovia alleged that the Former Employees misappropriated proprietary 
information, and conspired to use that information to open a competing firm in Florence. 
Moreover, Wachovia alleged that the Former Employees were soliciting Wachovia 
clients and personnel to develop the new firm. In arbitration, Wachovia sought the 
following: (1) a permanent injunction prohibiting the Former Employees’ solicitation of 
Wachovia’s clients and personnel, (2) the return of proprietary information the Former 
Employees allegedly misappropriated before leaving the Wachovia office; and (3) costs 
and attorneys’ fees pertaining to the arbitration proceeding.7  
 On November 26, 2008, the Former Employees filed their arbitration brief.
8
 The 
Former Employees asserted that Wachovia initiated a meritless claim and planned on 
using the arbitration as an attempt to “punish, intimidate and deter” other employees who 
were considering leaving Wachovia following the merger with A.G. Edwards.
9
 The 
Former Employees requested an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for defending against 
the arbitration.
10
 The Former Employees also argued that Wachovia’s claims were 
frivolous.
11
 Further, the Former Employees brought counterclaims for unjust enrichment 
and conversion, as well as violations of the South Carolina Wage Payment Law.
12
 
 On October 22, 2009, the Arbitration Panel requested accountings or proposals be 
submitted by the parties on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs for the November 23 and 
24, 2009 hearings.
13
 Wachovia requested the parties brief the Panel on legal authorities 
that addressed the issues of fees and costs.
14
 The Panel granted the request and directed 
the parties to submit briefs by November 23, 2009.
15
 At the November 23 hearing, the 
                                                 
6
 Wachovia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88505, at *7.  That same day, Wachovia filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of South Carolina at Florence, seeking preliminary injunctions against the 
former Employees. See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 475 n.3. Specifically, Wachovia sought judgments: (1) 
mandating that the Former Employees return proprietary information they allegedly misappropriated upon 
departure; and (2) preventing the Former Employees from soliciting remaining Wachovia personnel with 
job offers at the competing firm. The District Court granted the first preliminary injunction, but denied the 
latter. See id. 
7
 Wachovia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88505, at *7-8. 
8
 Id. at *9. 
9
 Id.  
10
 Id. at *9-10. 
11
 Id. at *10. 
12




 Id. at *10. 
15
 Wachovia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88505, at *10. 
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Wachovia attorney stated Wachovia was unprepared to turn in the requested information 
that day.
16
 The Panel advised the attorney that November 23 was the deadline, but 
allowed both parties to submit their briefs the following day.
17
 
 The following day, November 24, 2009, both parties submitted the requested 
information.
18
 The Former Employees argued they were entitled to an award for 
attorneys’ fees and costs under four authorities.19 In its brief, Wachovia submitted that 
neither party was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under a South Carolina law that 
precludes the award of attorneys’ fees, unless previously prescribed by statute or 
contract.
20
 Further, Wachovia argued that no statute or contract provisions was in place 
that would allow such a recovery.
21
  
 Near the end of the November 24, 2009 hearing, the Panel asked Wachovia’s 
attorney if “he felt he had been given a fair opportunity to present his case in its 
entirety.”22 The attorney for Wachovia responded in the affirmative, except that he did 
not believe he was able to adequately make his case on the matter of attorneys’ fees.23 
The Panel stated it might need clarification from the parties on the issue of attorneys’ 




 The Panel issued an arbitration award denying all of Wachovia’s claims on 
December 18, 2009.
25
 The Panel also awarded the Former Employees compensation for 
their Wage Act claims in the amount of $15,080.67, and awarded the Former Employees 








 See id. at *11. Former Employees argued that they were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs 
under: 1) the South Carolina Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 2) the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings 
Sanctions Act, 3) the South Carolina Wage Payment Act for their counterclaim, and 4) the Panel’s power 
under FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 13212(a). 
20
 See Wachovia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88505, at *11. (Wachovia arguing, “South Carolina follows the 
‘American Rule,’ whereby litigants are responsible for their own attorneys’ fees, unless there exists a 








 Id. at *12. 
25
 See Wachovia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88505, at *13-14 (confirming the award, denying all claims 
against the defendants, and awarding defendants money damages for their counterclaims). 
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$1,111,553.85 for attorneys’ fees under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings 
Sanctions Act (“FCPSA”).26 
 Wachovia moved to vacate the award in the United States District Court for South 
Carolina at Florence, arguing that the award was unenforceable under §§ 10(a)(3) and (4) 
of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).27 In support of its § 10(a)(3) argument, 
Wachovia claimed that the Panel engaged in misconduct by denying Wachovia the 
opportunity to sufficiently articulate its arguments on the matter of attorneys’ fees.28 In 
support of its § 10(a)(4) argument, Wachovia claimed that the Panel exceeded its 
authority and manifestly disregarded the law by relying on the FCPSA.
29
 Moreover, 
Wachovia argued the FCPSA is applicable only in judicial adjudications, and not in 
arbitration proceedings.
30
 The District Court denied Wachovia’s arguments, and 
confirmed the award.
31
 Wachovia appealed. 
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS 
 The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating the “severely circumscribed” 
standard of de novo review under which it would evaluate the District Court’s decision to 
confirm the award.
32
 Such limited review, the Fourth Circuit explained, is demanded by 
the FAA and the broad federal policy favoring arbitration.
33
 After explaining the standard 
of review, the Fourth Circuit considered whether an arbitrator must implement the state’s 
procedural law where the arbitrator implemented the state’s substantive law. 
                                                 
26
 See Wachovia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88505, at *13-14. 
27




 See id. According to Wachovia, disputing parties that face FCPSA sanctions are entitled to a thirty-day 
notice that FCPSA sanctions are being considered, and a separate hearing on the matter prior to imposing 
FCPSA sanctions. Wachovia argued that it never received notice that of the sanctions, and that it did not 
receive an opportunity to be heard on the legitimacy of its claims. 
30
 See id. Wachovia maintained that, even absent the Panel’s procedural errors in imposing FCPSA 
sanctions, the FCPSA only authorizes “courts” to award sanctions for frivolous civil proceedings post-
“verdict.” 
31
 Wachovia, 672 F.3d at 477-78. 
32
 See id. at 478. 
33
 See id. 
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A. The Arbitrator is Not Required to Apply the Procedural Provisions of State 
Law When He Applies the Substantive Provisions 
 The Fourth Circuit rejected Wachovia’s argument that an arbitrator is required to 
also apply a state’s procedural law when the arbitrator has adopted state’s substantive law 
in issuing an arbitral award.
34
 The Court first noted that the parties did not provide 
evidence of an agreement to import the procedural rules of South Carolina state law.
35
 
The Fourth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court has stated “informality of arbitral 
proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute 
resolution.”36 Therefore, the Panel was not required to follow the FCPSA’s procedural 
rules (i.e. the thirty-day notice requirement and separate hearing requirement for 
frivolous claims sanctions under the FCPSA), even though Wachovia attempted to import 
them after formation of the contract.
37
 
 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit explained that arbitrators have broad discretion in 
establishing arbitration procedures.
38
 In Marrowbone, the Fourth Circuit held “an 
arbitrator’s procedural ruling may not be overturned unless it was in bad faith or so gross 
as to amount to affirmative misconduct.”39 The Fourth Circuit determined this ruling was 
closely aligned with the plain language of FAA § 10(a)(3).
40
 Wachovia did not allege the 
arbitrator engaged in intentional misconduct by not importing the procedural provisions 
of the FCPSA.
41
 Thus, the Fourth Circuit rejected Wachovia’s argument.42 
                                                 
34
 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 478-79. Wachovia argued that the arbitrator violated 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3) and 
engaged in misconduct.  
35
 Id. at 479. 
36
 See id. See also AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (emphasizing the 
expeditious nature of arbitration’s informal proceedings as being an integral benefit in the decision to 
adjudicate claims through that method). 
37
 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 479 (noting that nothing prevents parties from adopting state law procedures 
in the formation of the arbitration clause or at any other time prior to the issue of an arbitration award). See 
also Int’l United Mine Workers v. Marrowbone, 232 F.3d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding “an arbitrator 
typically contains broad discretion over procedural matters and does not have to hear every piece of 
evidence that the parties wish to present”). 
38
 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 479; Marrowbone, 232 F.3d at 389. 
39
 Marrowbone, 232 F.3d at 390. 
40
 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 479 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) which authorizes vacatur 
“where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing…or in refusing to hear 







 Lastly, the Fourth Circuit found that the arbitrator did not deprive Wachovia of a 
fundamentally fair proceeding by refusing to hear testimony or evidence on the issue of 
attorneys’ fees and costs.43 The Fourth Circuit noted that Wachovia, not the arbitrator, 
was at fault.
44
 The Fourth Circuit explained that it would not overturn an arbitral award 
under FAA § 10(a)(3) where one party failed to follow the applicable procedures put in 
place by an arbitrator.
45
 The Fourth Circuit further explained that Wachovia, by turning 
in its briefs on the issue on the final day of arbitration, left no time for the issue to be 
debated.
46
 The court summarized: 
After Wachovia complained that it had not received a fair hearing 
on the issue of fees, the arbitrators asked Wachovia if it wanted to 
submit additional briefs. Wachovia turned down this opportunity. 
Even if Wachovia is correct in its contention that the FCPSA 
requires a hearing in the context of arbitration, it could have used 
the additional briefing to explain why a hearing was necessary.
47
 
B. The Arbitrator Did Not Demonstrate Manifest Disregard of the Law by 
Applying the Substantive Provisions of a State Law with an Alternative 
Procedure 
 The Fourth Circuit lastly addressed Wachovia’s argument that the District Court 
erred in finding the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law. 
48
 The Fourth Circuit 
laid the foundation for its analysis of manifest disregard of the law by explaining both the 
Circuit’s application of the doctrine prior to the ruling in Hall Street Associates, and the 
status of the doctrine after Stolt-Nielsen.
49
 
 Prior to Hall Street Associates, in Long John Silver’s, the Fourth Circuit held that 
manifest disregard was a limited two-part test independent of the FAA.
50
 In Long John 
Silver’s the Fourth Circuit stated when the applicable legal principle is clearly defined 
and not subject to reasonable debate, and the arbitrator refused to heed that legal 
                                                 
43




 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
46
 Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 480. 
47
 See id. (holding that a party cannot allege misconduct on behalf of an arbitrator when a refusal to hear 
testimony or take additional briefing is the result of a party’s failure to meet the procedural deadlines it 




 Id.  
50
 Long John Silver’s v. Cole, 814 F.3d 345, 349-50 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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principle, the arbitrator has demonstrated a manifest disregard of the law.
51
 However, the 
Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates held that FAA §§ 10 and 11 provided the 
exclusive grounds for vacatur.
52
 Subsequently, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court held 
that it need not decide whether manifest disregard survived its decision in Hall Street 
Associates as an independent grounds for vacatur or as a judicial gloss of § 10 of the 
FAA, and ultimately vacated the arbitration award at issue.
53
 
 Here, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Stolt-Nielsen to mean that manifest disregard 
continues to exist either as a judicial gloss of the FAA’s authorized grounds or as an 
independent ground for vacatur.
54
 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit did not foreclose Long 
John Silver’s independent test as a ground for vacatur.55 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit 
held that although manifest disregard exists as either an independent ground for vacatur 
or as a judicial gloss of FAA § 10, it need not decide which interpretation controls 
because under either the Panel was not required to import the procedural provisions of the 
FCPSA.
56
 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District 
Court for the District of South Carolina.
57
 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE  
 The threshold rulings in Wachovia demonstrate consistency in the Fourth 
Circuit’s constrained review of arbitral awards,58 and also demonstrate the favorable 
                                                 
51
 Long John Silver’s, 814 F.3d at 349-50. 
52
 See Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) (holding §§ 10 and 11 provide the 
exclusive regimes of review). Commentators have suggested that the holding in Hall Street eliminated the 
common law grounds for manifest disregard, leaving only a “judicial gloss” of the FAA, but also noted 
“mystifying dicta” that calls this proposition into question. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Rise in 
Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates. 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT. RES. 593 
(2013). 
53
 See Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 (2010) (“We do not decide 
whether  ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in [Hall Street Associates], as an independent ground 
for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.… 
Assuming, arguendo, that such a standard applies, we find it satisfied for the reasons that follow.”).   
54
 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 482-83 (discussing the Supreme Court’s approach as tracking the majority of 
circuit court approaches to manifest disregard prior to Hall Street). The Fourth Circuit interpreted the 
language in Stolt-Nielsen to allow for manifest disregard to be reviewed as either a judicial gloss of the 
FAA or independent grounds for judicial review because the Court assumed the applicability of a two part 
test posed by AnimalFeeds.  
55
 See id. at 483 (“we decline to adopt the position of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that manifest disregard 




 Id. at 483. 
58
 See id. at 478. 
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treatment courts grant arbitration’s informal procedures.59 However, the enumeration of 
an “either or” approach, to what test determines whether an arbitrator acted in manifest 
disregard of the law, should give practitioners in the Fourth Circuit pause.  
 Wachovia demonstrates the downward iteration of uncertainty regarding the 
application of manifest disregard that began after Hall Street Associates,
60
 and was again 
highlighted by Stolt-Nielsen.
61
 The court in Stolt-Nielsen correctly reiterated the high bar 
for vacatur that manifest disregard establishes, but did not decide whether it was an 
independent test or a judicial glass of FAA §§ 10(a)(3) or (4).
62
 Ultimately, the correct 
decision by the Supreme Court to vacate the award left unclear whether manifest 




 Practitioners in other circuits can at least take solace in the idea that their circuit 
has taken a definitive stance on which test for manifest disregard is to be applied.
64
 In the 
Fourth Circuit, however, practitioners have no such assurance.
65
 Instead, they are left 
with a duplicitous test founded upon principles in a controversial, if not troublesome, 
Supreme Court opinion. 
                                                 
59
 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 479. 
60
 See supra note 52. 
61
 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit in Wachovia adopted the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning from Stolt-Nielsen, and assumed manifest disregard either existed as an independent test or a 
judicial gloss of the FAA grounds for vacatur. 
62
 See supra note 53.  
63
 Manifest disregard was further discussed by the Supreme Court in Sutter, where the Court found that an 
arbitrator simply construing a contract cannot be acting in manifest disregard of the law because 
misinterpreting a contract does is not a departure from the delegated task of interpretation. See generally 
Oxford Health Plans, L.L.C. v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013) (holding an arbitrator misinterpreting a 
contract does not constitute manifest disregard). However, the Supreme Court in Sutter did not revisit the 
tests for manifest disregard. 
64
 For court decisions finding that manifest disregard is a separate non-statutory ground for vacatur did not 
survive the Hall Street, see S. Comm’ns Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 720 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(holding judicially created bases for vacatur “are no longer valid”); Bain v. Bank, No. 13-30120, 2013 WL 
4647317 (5th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) (holding “to the extent Whitney asserts the arbitral award evinced a 
‘manifest disregard for the law,” this independent, nonstatutory ground cannot be the basis for vacatur or 
modification in this circuit.”). Additionally, for court decisions finding manifest disregard continues to 
exist as a judicial gloss of the FAA, see Matthews v. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 
1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (manifest disregard is the “shorthand for a statutory ground under [the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA)]…which states that the court may vacate where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers.”); Giller v. Oracle USA, Inc., 512 Fed. App’x 71, 72 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (“[w]e continue to 
recognize ‘manifest disregard of the law’ as a valid ground for vacatur as a ‘judicial gloss’ on the grounds 
specified by Section 10 of the FAA.”); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv. West Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1289-90 
(9th Cir. 2009) (holding that manifest disregard of the law is a valid ground for vacatur because it is a part 
of § 10(a)(4)). 
65
 See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 345 
 
 In  Wachovia, the Fourth Circuit opted to use the same analysis as the Supreme 
Court in Stolt-Nielsen and leave open the question of whether manifest disregard exists as 
an independent ground for vacatur or as a judicial gloss of the FAA.
66
 Practitioners and 
scholars should note that the courts below the Fourth Circuit have recently litigated 
which test for manifest disregard should be applied, and the results are inconsistent.
67
 By 
not providing guidance to the district courts regarding what test to apply to discern if an 
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, the Fourth Circuit has potentially created an 
intra-circuit regime that inconsistently reviews and enforces arbitration awards.
68
 Now, 
rather than focusing on a consistent application of a solitary stringent intra-circuit 
standard, practitioners must juggle duplicitous tests between the district courts. 
 It is, however, important to note that the decision in Wachovia did not lower the 
high hurdle a party must meet during the review of an arbitral award.
69
 The Fourth 
Circuit has made it clear that its courts will not overturn an arbitral award because the 
arbitrator did its job poorly or did not adjudicate reasonably.
70
 Instead the Fourth Circuit 
will only vacate an award where the arbitrator failed to do its job.
71
 Further, the Fourth 
Circuit did not hold that either the separate and independent or judicial gloss test for 
manifest disregard of the law was less stringent than the other. Rather, the Court 
enunciated two high bars for a party seeking vacatur to meet, even though enunciating 
one would have sufficed. 
V.   CRITIQUE 
 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the threshold issues in Wachovia is grounded in a 
consistent application of the federal policy favoring arbitration,
72
 but the lack of guidance 
from the Fourth Circuit in what test for manifest disregard district courts are to apply is 
problematic for uniformity in the review of arbitral awards.
73
  
                                                 
66
 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
67
 See infra text accompanying note 79. 
68
 See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
69
 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d 478 n.5. 
70
 See id. at 480. Here, the arbitrator did nothing remotely wrong. Foremost, he was not required to import 
the procedural protections of the FCPSA, so long as he applied its substance. Further, any lack of fairness 
in the proceedings was constructed by Wachovia’s lack of diligence in meeting deadlines it asked for and 
agreed to in the arbitration proceedings. 
71
 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
72
 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
73
 For a discussion of the problematic lack of uniformity among the federal circuits regarding that status of 
manifest disregard after Hall Street Associates and Stolt-Nielsen, see Anthony Rallo, The Veil of 
Acquiescence: Between the Lines of an Intuitive Appellate Decision the 9th Circuit Subtly Marginalizes 
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 Mere availability of manifest disregard as a grounds for vacatur already represents 
a point of disdain for arbitration under United States arbitration laws for both foreign and 
domestic entities.
74
 The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Wachovia further frustrates the 
matter by reiterating the Supreme Court’s analysis of manifest disregard in Stolt-Nielsen. 
Variability in the test for manifest disregard applied in the various Fourth Circuit district 
courts, who determine whether an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, further 
emphasizes the source of the aforementioned disdain.  
 Under Fourth Circuit precedent, the independent test for manifest disregard of the 
law enunciated in Long John Silver’s states that the arbitrator acts in manifest disregard 
of the law where the arbitrator’s conduct is contrary to clearly established legal 
principles.
75
 In contrast, the judicial gloss test treats manifest disregard of the law as 
either misconduct or acts in excess of authority by the arbitrator.
76
 While comparable in 
their deferential application, the tests are substantively different. Allowing the tests to co-
exist is duplicitous, and fails to minimize variability in the review of arbitration awards. 
 Where other circuits have at least handled the confusion that resulted from Stolt-
Nielsen by clearly deciding that manifest disregard is no longer an independent ground 
for vacatur or that it is simply a judicial gloss of the FAA,
77
 the Fourth Circuit in 
Wachovia provided its district courts with no guidance as to the ground’s fate.78 Rather 
than preventing intra-circuit confusion and establishing a clear status for manifest 
disregard in Wachovia, the Fourth Circuit allowed the matter to be further obfuscated in 
the resultant case law. Left without guidance, variability among the district courts 
resulted. Within the past two years, the common law test for manifest disregard, the 
treatment of manifest disregard as a judicial gloss of the FAA, and the application of 
Wachovia’s “either or” analysis have all occurred in the Fourth Circuit.79 
                                                                                                                                                 
FAA Limitations on Judicial Review, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 683, 690 n.75 (forthcoming Spring 2014) (on 
file with author). 
74
 See generally Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, ‘Manifest Disregard' and International 
Arbitration Awards, N.Y. L.J., January 24, 2013. 
75
 See Long John Silver’s, 814 F.3d at 349-50. 
76
 See Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1115; Giller, 512 Fed. App’x at 72. 
77
 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
78
 As such, the Fourth Circuit is now internally split in how to determine manifest disregard of the law. See 
Wells Fargo Advisors, L.L.C. v. Watts, 858 F.Supp.2d 591, 597 (W.D.N.C. 2012) [hereinafter Wells Fargo 
I] (discussing and applying both a statutory grounds for vacatur and federal common law grounds for 
vacatur in manifest disregard); see also Choice Hotels Int’l v. Cherokee Hospitality, Civ.A. No. DKC 11-
2095, 2012 WL 5995583, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2012) (utilizing the judicial gloss of the FAA test of 
manifest disregard); see also Cherry Road Investors 2, L.L.C. v. TIC Props., L.L.C., Civ.A. No. 6:12-3076-
TMC, 2013 WL 3208460, at *2 (D.S.C.  June 24, 2013) (citing the independent 2 part test used in Long 
John Silver’s v. Cole, 814 F.3d 345, 349-50 (4th Cir. 2006)). Both the independent common law and 
judicial gloss categorizations establish high bars for vacatur that protect the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
However, by allowing the tests to coexist, the Fourth Circuit provides multiple methods to challenge an 
arbitral award where a single method could suffice. 
79
 See supra note 78. 
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 After the decision in Wachovia, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland in Choice Hotels elected to analyze manifest disregard as a judicial gloss of 
FAA § 10.
80
 Conversely, the United States District Court for the District Court of South 
Carolina in Cherry Road Investors 2 applied the independent test for manifest 
disregarded propagated by the Fourth Circuit in Long John Silver’s.81 
 Further, in Wells Fargo Advisors, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of North Carolina applied both the judicial gloss standard and the independent 
test for manifest disregard.
82
 However, the court in Wells Fargo I noted a lack of clarity 
regarding the common law standard of manifest disregard.
83
 On recent appeal, in Wells 
Fargo II, the Fourth Circuit upheld its approach in Wachovia and affirmed the district 
court’s holding that the arbitrator did not act in manifest disregard of the law under either 
the judicial gloss or separate independent test approach.
84
 The decision in Wells Fargo II 
demonstrates the Fourth Circuit’s reluctance to clear the air surrounding manifest 
disregard. Rather than clarify Wachovia, or enunciate a clear ground for manifest 
disregard, the Fourth Circuit adhered to its duplicitous precedent, seemingly punting the 
issue for resolution by the Supreme Court. 
 The aforementioned cases demonstrate the problems likely to arise from the 
Fourth Circuit’s lack of clarity in Wachovia. The Supreme Court created problems for 
uniformity in the application of manifest disregard in Stolt-Nielsen,
85
 and the Fourth 
Circuit allowed the inconsistency to trickle down to its district courts. Until the Supreme 
Court clearly determines the fate of manifest disregard, circuits that take a hardline stance 
when determining the test can at least remain internally consistent. The Fourth Circuit 
does not even earn this consolation prize by adopting the Supreme Court’s “either or” 
approach in Wachovia, but rather adds an internally fractured case law to the existing 
manifest disregard circuit split.
86
 
                                                 
80
 See Choice Hotels, 2012 WL 5995583, at *3 (holding the arbitrator did not demonstrate manifest 
disregard of the law). 
81
 See Cherry Road Investors 2, 2013 WL 3208460, at *2 (holding the arbitrator did not demonstrate 
manifest disregard of the law). 
82
 See Wells Fargo Advisors, 858 F.Supp.2d at 597. The court in Wells Fargo I, ultimately found that the 
arbitrator did not demonstrate manifest disregard of the law. See id. at 600. 
83
 See id. at 597 n.3. 
84
 See Wells Fargo Advisors, L.L.C. v. Watters, 540 Fed. App’x 229, 231 (4th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Wells 
Fargo II] (citing Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 483). The language from Wachovia cited by the Fourth Circuit in 
Wells Fargo II focuses on the proposition that manifest disregard exists as either an independent grounds 
for review or as a judicial gloss of the enumerated grounds for vacatur in the FAA.  
85
 See supra note 73. 
86
 For discussion of the circuit split over the application of manifest disregard, see supra note 64. For 
discussion of the varying district court applications of manifest disregard in the Fourth Circuit post-
Wachovia, see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. 
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 It is worth noting, however, the Fourth Circuit’s decision does not diminish the 
high bar for the vacatur of an arbitration award established by manifest disregard after 
Wachovia.
87
 Instead, there are multiple bars a party could choose to approach and no 
direction for which it should try to clear. The Fourth Circuit may have failed to limit the 
number of manifest disregard tests, but the “either or” analysis still provides limited 
review of arbitration awards.  
 Now, until either the Fourth Circuit reevaluates the stance it took in Wachovia, or 
the Supreme Court clarifies Stolt-Nielsen’s treatment of manifest disregard, the iteration 
of uncertainty will continue to loom over this ground for reviewing an arbitral award. 
This uncertainty is not, and cannot, be favorable for arbitration. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The contradictory judgment in Wachovia demonstrates the favorable treatment 
arbitration is given in the Fourth Circuit,
88
 while granting that favorable treatment under a 
duplicitous test that frustrates uniformity in the enforcement of arbitration awards.
89
 
While the court in Wachovia approached reviewing the confirmation of an award with 
proper deference, it enunciated two tests for district courts to determine whether an 
arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law. The resultant case law on manifest 
disregard illustrates variability in litigation surrounding arbitration award enforcement 
that the Fourth Circuit refuses to correct. 
 
 
                                                 
87
 None of the resultant case law in the Fourth Circuit has resulted in an arbitration award being vacated, 
see supra notes 80-83, and note 85. The various tests for manifest disregard remain narrowly applied. 
88
 See supra notes 32 and 33. 
89
 See supra notes 80-84. 
